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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. When a check is tendered on condition that negotiation of
it will constitute full satisfaction of an unliquidated claim,
does the negotiation of the check with knowledge of the condition
create an accord and satisfaction, even though the payee does not
subjectively intend to assent to the condition?
2.

Does the Court of Appeals opinion conflict with the

decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Marton Remodeling v. Jensen,
706 P. 2d 607 (Utah 1985)?
3.

Does the Court of Appeals opinion conflict with the

decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals, in Cove View
Excavating and Construction Co, v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474 (Utah App.
1988)?
4.

Does the Court of Appeals decision so far depart from the

accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or does it so
far sanction such a departure by the trial court, as to call for
an exercise of this Court's power of supervision?
REFERENCE TO REPORT OF THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals opinion is reported at 1990 WL 69055.1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Court of Appeals filed its opinion May 24, 1990. No
petition for rehearing was filed, nor was any order entered
extending the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari.
1

This Petition will refer to the slip opinion of the Court
of Appeals, attached as Appendix A.
1

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals under the authority of Utah Code Ann.
Sections 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-2(5), and Rules 42-48 of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF STATUTES, ETC.
There are no controlling provisions of constitutions,
statutes, ordinances, or regulations in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case

This is a civil action for collection of money for snow
removal services rendered under a written contract.
2.

Course of the Proceedings

Estate Landscape and Snow Removal, Inc. ("Estate") filed its
complaint on August 8, 1985, praying for damages of $30,162.50 (R.
2).

Estate filed an Amended Complaint on May 16, 1986, praying

for damages of $21,549.50 (R. 24). On July 31, 1986, The Mountain
States Telephone & Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell") filed a
motion for summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of
accord and satisfaction (R. 45), which the Court (Judge Michael
Murphy presiding) denied in a Summary Decision and Order filed
December 29, 1986 (R. 127). The case was tried to the Court
(Judge Timothy Hanson presiding) on January 12 and 13, 1988.
3.

Disposition in the Lower Courts

On April 1, 1988, the trial court entered judgment for
Estate.

Mountain Bell appealed to the Court of Appeals.
2

On May

24, 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for the
principal, but remanded for amendment of the judgment to exclude
compounded interest.
4.

Statement of Relevant Facts

Estate and Mountain Bell entered into a written agreement
wherein Estate agreed to perform snow removal services for
Mountain Bell at specified rates, including the removal of snow at
Mountain Bell's central office in Alta, Utah "when the snow
reaches four inches."

(Exhibit 3)

Between December 28, 1984 and April 1, 1985, Estate performed
snow removal services at Mountain Bell's Alta office. At the
close of the snow season, Estate sent Mountain Bell an itemized
final bill for $30,162.50, representing services rendered at the
Alta site during that period.

(Exhibit 4)

Mountain Bell disputed

the bill as excessive, principally because it contained charges
for snow removal on days when less than four inches of snowfall
was reported.2

On about June 14, 1985, Mountain Bell prepared a

letter to Estate detailing the portions of the bill that it
disputed.3

(Exhibit 6)

The letter concluded:

Based on the above identified billing descrepancies [sic] we
have enclosed a check for $8613.00 which is payment in full
for satisfaction of contracted services. If you are not
willing to accept that sum, $8613.00 in full satisfaction of
2

Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 37-43. Because there were
several reporters at various times during the trial, the
transcript is not paginated consecutively. Therefore, it will be
referred to in this Petition by date, and where necessary, by the
name of the reporter.
3

Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 42-44.
3

the sums due, DO NOT negotiate the check, for upon your
negotiation of that check, we will treat the matter as fully
paid.
(emphasis in original)
Mountain Bell's bill payment supervisor held the letter
pending delivery of a check for $8,613.004 from Mountain Bell's
accounting department for enclosure with the letter.5

However, on

or about June 21, 1985, rather than delivering the check to the
person holding the letter, Mountain Bell's accounting department
mailed the check directly to Estate.6

Upon discovering that the

check had been sent separately, Mountain Bell's bill payment
supervisor sent the letter without enclosing a check, on about
June 28, 1985.7

Because it was sent by certified mail, it was not

received until August 5, 1985.8

At the time Estate received

Mountain Bell's letter, it had not negotiated the check.9

Estate

knew that the $8,613.00 check that it had received earlier was the
check referred to in Mountain Bell's letter of June 14, 1985.10
4

$8,613.00 represented the difference between the amount of
the bill and the charges that Mountain Bell disputed.
5

Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 45.

6

Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 44-46.

7

Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 45; Smith Transcript of Jan.
13 at 5.
8

Transcript of Jan. 12 at 11-12.

9

Exhibit 8; Response to Defendant's Second Set of Requests
for Admissions #7, R. at 101.
10

Response to Defendant's Second Set of Requests for
Admissions #8, R. at 101; Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 24-25.
Smith Transcript of Jan. 13 at 12.

On August 8, 1985, Estate filed suit to recover the entire
amount of its bill, $30,162.50.

(R. 2)

It did not cash the

$8,613.00 check until on or about October 28, 1985, when the check
was negotiated and deposited for collection.11
amended its complaint to claim $21,549.50.

Estate later

(R. 24)

On about July 31, 1986, Mountain Bell filed a motion for
summary judgment, asserting that Estate's negotiation of the check
for $8,613.00, with knowledge that it was offered in full
satisfaction of Mountain Bell's obligation to Estate, constituted
an accord and satisfaction.

(R. 45)

Judge Murphy denied the

motion in a Summary Decision and Order, (R. 127) 1 2 and the case
later went to trial before Judge Hanson.

In denying Mountain

Bell's affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, Judge
Hanson (the trial judge) relied heavily on Judge Murphy's Summary
Decision denying Mountain Bell's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, stating that he considered that ruling to be the law of
the case.13

No finding of fact was made to support the denial of

the accord and satisfaction defense.

(R. 270)

Neither Judge Murphy nor Judge Hansen ever characterized the
denial of Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment as being a
ruling on the merits of the accord and satisfaction defense,
11

Exhibit 8; Response to Defendant's Second Set of Requests
for Admissions #9, R. at 101.
12

The Summary Decision and Order is attached hereto as
Appendix D.
13

Transcript of Jan. 15 at 3-4.
5

precluding the introduction of evidence on that issue at the
trial; in fact, considerable evidence on that issue was introduced
at the trial.

No order was ever entered granting Estate summary

judgment on that issue.

However, the Court of Appeals treated

Judge Murphy's denial of Mountain Bell's motion as having the
effect of a ruling on the merits, or a summary judgment in
Estate's favor on the accord and satisfaction defense.
at 4-6)

(Slip Op.

In a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the

judgment except for the award of compounded interest, and remanded
to the trial court for amendment of the judgment in that respect.
(Slip Op. at 8-9)

Judge Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.

(Slip Op. at 10-11)
ARGUMENT
NEGOTIATION OF A CHECK OFFERED IN FULL SETTLEMENT OF AN
UNLIQUIDATED CLAIM CREATES AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE PAYEE'S SUBJECTIVE INTENTION TO THE
CONTRARY.
The Court of Appeals' principal error was its holding that
even though Estate negotiated Mountain Bell's check knowing that
it was offered in full satisfaction of the disputed claim, "the
mutual assent for the would-be accord is lacking."
7)

(Slip Op. at

The Court elaborated:
[T]here is no indication that Estate Landscape assented to
the letter as an accord. Its signature on the check is not
an assent to an accord not found on the face of the check as
a restrictive endorsement, where the party to whom the accord
is offered has expressly rejected the proposed accord,
continued the dispute, and filed litigation to resolve it
adversarially in court.

(Id., footnote omitted)
6

Later in the majority opinion, the Court acknowledged:
It would, perhaps, be possible to offer an accord and provide
in the offer that cashing an accompanying check would be
acceptance of the offer, since the offeror can, within
reason, specify the act that shall constitute acceptance.
(Slip Op. at 8; footnote omitted).

However, the Court failed to

conclude that precisely such a circumstance existed in this case.
Rather, the Court stated, "However, the offeree can also reject
the offer, after which there is nothing left to accept."

(Id.)

The Court then concluded that because Estate had "rejected"
Mountain Bell's offer of an accord, it was thereafter free (and
perhaps even duty-bound) to negotiate the check as a partial
payment, without risking a finding of accord and satisfaction.
(Id.)
In essence, the Court of Appeals has held that subjective,
mutual assent is a condition precedent for accord and
satisfaction, and that assent may not be inferred as a matter of
law from the negotiation of a check offered in full satisfaction
of a bona fide dispute over an unliquidated claim.

This analysis

is directly contrary to Utah law as expressed in Marton Remodeling
v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985) and Cove View Excavating and
Construction Co. v. Flynn. 758 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1988).
In Marton, the plaintiff remodeled defendant's home under a
"time and materials" contract.

The parties disagreed on the

proper charges for the work (defendant asserting, as in the case
at bar, that the number of hours claimed was excessive).
Defendant sent plaintiff a check with the notation:
7

Endorsement hereof constitutes full and final satisfaction of
any and all claims payee may have against [defendant] or his
property, arising from any circumstances existing on the date
hereof.
706 P.2d at 608. The plaintiff wrote defendant a letter refusing
to accept the check in full payment and demanding the balance.
When defendant did not pay, plaintiff wrote ''not full payment" on
the check, then cashed it and sued for the balance.

Under those

circumstances, the plaintiff obviously did not subjectively assent
to the check as full payment.

Nevertheless, this Court held that

the negotiation of the check created an accord and satisfaction:
[W]hen a bona fide dispute arises . . . and a check is
tendered in full payment of an unliquidated claim . . .
arising out of a "time and materials" contract, the creditor
may not disregard the condition attached. Corbin on
Contracts § 1279 explains:
The fact that the creditor scratches out the words "in
full payment," or other similar words indicating that
the payment is tendered in full satisfaction, does not
prevent his retention of the money from operating as an
assent to the discharge. The creditor's action in such
case is quite inconsistent with his words. It may,
indeed, be clear that he does not in fact assent to the
offer made by the debtor, so that there is no actual
"meeting of the minds." But this is merely another
illustration of the fact that the making of a contract
frequently does not reguire such an actual meeting.
706 P.2d at 609 (emphasis added).

Apropos to the case at bar,

this Court then quoted with approval an illustration from the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 281:
6. A contracts with B to have repairs made on A's house, no
price being fixed. B sends A a bill for $1,000. A honestly
disputes this amount and sends a letter explaining that he
thinks the amount excessive and is enclosing a check for $800
as payment in full. B, after reading the letter, indorses
the check and deposits it in his bank for collection. B is
bound by an accord under which he promises to accept payment
of the check in satisfaction of A's debt for repairs. The
8

result is the same if, before indorsing the check, B adds the
words "Accepted under protest as part payment." The result
would be different, however, if B's claim were liquidated,
undisputed and matured.
706 P.2d at 609-10 (emphasis added)

This Court then cited further

cases14 for the proposition that
a creditor cannot avoid the consequences of his exercise of
dominion by a declaration that he does not assent to the
condition attached by the debtor. The last cited case
succinctly stated the law to be, "The law gave the plaintiffs
the choice of accepting the check on defendant's terms or of
returning it."
706 P.2d at 610 (emphasis added).

Finally, this Court quoted with

approval the following statement from Pillow v. Thermoaas Company
of Walnut Ridge. 6 Ark. App. 402, 644 S.W.2d 292 (1982):
If we were to decide that a creditor can reserve his rights
on a "payment in full" check, it would seriously circumvent
what has been universally accepted in the business community
as a convenient means for the resolution of disagreements.
706 P.2d at 610.
The holding and analysis of Marton correctly state the law of
Utah and of the vast majority of other jurisdictions.

See

generally. Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that Acceptance of
Check Purporting to be Final Settlement of Disputed Amount
Constitutes Accord and Satisfaction. 42 A.L.R. 4th 12 (1985).
More importantly to this petition, Marton directly contradicts the
Court of Appeals7 analysis in this case, which erroneously
concluded that subjective, mutual assent is necessary to an accord
and satisfaction, and that a creditor may reject the condition
14

Miller v. Prince Street Elevator Co.. 41 N.M. 330, 68 P.2d
663 (1937); Wilmeth v. Lee. 316 P.2d 614 (Okla. 1957); Graffam v.
Geronda, 304 A.2d 76 (Me. 1973).
9

attached to a "full satisfaction" check, and cash it with
impunity.

The Court of Appeals' decision cannot be reconciled

with, and must therefore yield to, the rule of law stated in
Marton.
In Cove View Excavating and Construction Co. v. Flvnn, 758
P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1988), the defendant disputed plaintiffs
charges for construction equipment rental under a contract that
specified rates, but not a specific term.

The defendant sent

plaintiff a check with the notation on the front of the check:
"pmt in full to date labor & materials," and a further notation on
the back of the check: "payment in full for all labor and
materials to 6/26/84."

On the advice of counsel, the defendant

crossed out the restrictive language on the back of the check and
negotiated it, then sued for the balance.
The Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for the plaintiff,
holding that the negotiation of the check created an accord and
satisfaction, "notwithstanding [plaintiff's] actual intent." 758
P.2d at 477. The Court further stated:
In light of the express condition on the check, the fact that
Grundy did not subjectively intend to accept the check as
full payment of Flynn's obligation is legally irrelevant. A
creditor may not disregard the condition attached to a check
tendered in full payment of an unliquidated or disputed
claim, [citing Marton] Grundy's options were to accept the
check on Flynn's terms or return it. [citing cases] His
negotiation of Flvnn's check was an acceptance of Flynn's
offer of full payment, notwithstanding his lack of any actual
intent to accept it as such.
758 P.2d at 478 (emphasis added).

10

It is obvious that the rule announced in Cove View, which
followed Marton, is incompatible with the Court of Appeals7 ruling
in this case.

The majority of the Court of Appeals misapplied the

concept of mutual assent, requiring actual intent to accept an
offer of accord, whereas the law infers mutual assent and
acceptance from the act of negotiating a full payment check withT
knowledge of the condition, regardless of the payee's actual
intent or efforts to avoid the condition.15

For this reason, the

petition for certiorari must be granted to avoid an irreconcilable
15

See also, Flaael v. Southwest Clinical Phvsiatrists, P.C.,
157 Ariz. 196, 755 P.2d 1184, 1190 (1988)("[Defendant] clearly
expressed its intent that the check was paid as a settlement in
full. It may be that [plaintiff] did not assent and there was no
actual meeting of the minds. However, the making of a contract in
this circumstance does not require such an actual meeting of the
minds. As a matter of law, an accord and satisfaction occurred
when [plaintiff] cashed the check."); Air Van Lines, Inc. v.
Buster, 673 P.2d 774, 779 (Alaska 1983)("[R]egardless of
[plaintiff's] intentions, a purported reservation of rights is
ineffective when a clearly conditional tender is accepted."); Van
Riper v. Baker, 61 Or. App. 540, 658 P.2d 537, 539 (1983)("It is
well settled that 'one who accepts and cashes a check which
purports by notation or by the terms upon which it was tendered to
be in full satisfaction of a disputed claim between the parties
has accepted the payment on those terms.7 . . . . This rule
applies even when the amount tendered is no greater than the
debtor admits he owes . . . or when the creditor does not intend
that his act of cashing the check constitute an acceptance . . .
or when the creditor asserts to the debtor that the check is
received only in part payment."); Welbourne & Purdv, Inc. v.
Mahon, 54 A.D.2d 1046, 388 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (1976)("[N]either the
[plaintiff's] representative's declarations nor the [plaintiff's]
manager's protest in suing for the balance can change the rule
that '[w]hat is said is overridden by what is done, and assent is
imputed as an inference of law'."); Miller v. Prince Street
Elevator Co.. 68 P.2d 663, 665 (1937)("When the appellee accepted
and cashed such check and appropriated unto himself the proceeds
thereof, well knowing that such payment was burdened with such
condition, he thereby accepted it as tendered. He could not
accept the benefit of such tender without likewise accepting its
condition.").
11

conflict with prior cases decided both by this Court and by
another panel of the Court of Appeals.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £/(

day of June, 1990.

THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY

BY_

'loyd^k. Jensen, Attorney

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed, postage
prepaid, to each of the following on the 1{ day of June, 1990:
Lowell V. Summerhays, Esq.
Adamson & Summerhays
6400 Commerce Park
488 East 6400 South, Suite 430
P.O. Box 1355
Murray, Utah 84107
David D. Loreman, Esq.
5450 Green Street
Murray, Utah 84123

^M,
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APPENDIX

Estate Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. The
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company. No. 880428CAf slip op. (Utah App., filed May 24, 1990)
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Judgment
Summary Decision and Order denying Mountain Bell's Motion for
Summary Judgment
Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985)
Cove View Excavating and Construction Co. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d
474 (Utah App. 1988)

A.

Estate Landscape and Snov Removal Specialists, Inc. v. The
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company» No. 880428
CAf slip op. (Utah App., filed May 24f 1990)

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

™h*( -• ^.

ooOoo
Estate Landscape and Snow
Removal Specialists, Inc.,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

OPINION
Y^J
(For Publication)
Case No. 880428-CA

Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Company,
Defendant and Appellant.

Salt Lake County, Third District,
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy and Timothy R. Hanson.
Attorneys:

Floyd A. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
David D. Loreman and Lowell V. Summerhays, Murray,
for Appellee

Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and Larson.l
LARSON, Judge:
This is an action seeking to collect amounts alleged to be
due under a contract for snow removal services rendered by Estate
Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. (Estate Landscape).
Defendant Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
(Mountain Bell) appeals from a judgment in favor of Estate
Landscape.
Estate Landscape and Mountain Bell entered into a written
contract which provided that Estate Landscape would remove snow
from certain buildings occupied by Mountain Bell in return for
payment at a specified rate. Estate Landscape performed its work
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, sitting by
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10)
(Supp. 1989).

suitably, and billed Mountain Bell twice, once for work through
December 27 and again at the end of the snow season. 2 The
billing separately listed each snow removal item by date.
Mountain Bell paid the first bill, but considered the
$30,162.90 total of the second bill to be excessive for the
services at its Alta office. It therefore sent Estate
Landscape a check for only $8,613. The check did not contain a
restrictive endorsement or a waiver on its face. Upon receipt
of the check, Estate Landscape responded by acknowledging
partial payment and requesting the balance remaining, but
Mountain Bell refused to pay the balance. Next, Mountain Bell
sent Estate Landscape a letter^ explaining its position
concerning the bill for the Alta office. According to the
letter, the contract for the Alta office provided that Estate
Landscape would remove snow when it reached a depth of four
inches. From snowfall records for Alta, it appeared that
Estate Landscape had billed for snow removal on days when the
snowfall was less than four inches. On the basis of the
snowfall records, therefore, Mountain Bell refused to pay for
snow removal on certain days for which Estate Landscape had
charged for its services. The letter specifically detailed all
contested snow removal services by date. Mountain Bell's
letter concluded:

2. The contract required monthly statements, rather than a
single statement at the end of the season. Mountain Bell
claimed that Estate's failure to provide monthly billings was a
breach, but the trial court found that the breach was not
material, and thus, it did not excuse Mountain Bell from its
obligations. See Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah
1982); Darrell J. Didericksen & Sons, Inc. v. Magna Water and
Sewer Improvement Dist., 613 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1980); 4 A.
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 946 (1951). That finding is not
contested on appeal.
3. The check for $8,613 was to have been sent with the letter;
however, Mountain Bell's accounting department mailed the check
without the letter. Upon learning that the check had already
been mailed, Mountain Bell sent its letter, which reached
Estate Landscape before it cashed the check from Mountain
Bell. Estate Landscape admits that it knew that the letter was
in reference to the check it had received from Mountain Bell
but had not as yet cashed.

880428-CA

2

Based on the above identified billing
discrepancies we have enclosed!-4-! a
check for $8613*00 which is payment in
full for satisfaction of contracted
services. If you are not willing to
accept that sum, $8613.00 in full
satisfaction of sums due, DO NOT negotiate
the check, for upon vour negotiation of
that check, we will treat the matter as
fully paid.
(Emphasis in original).
When Estate Landscape received the letter, the check it had
earlier received from Mountain Bell had not been cashed.
Estate Landscape responded to Mountain Bell's letter by
commencing this action against Mountain Bell. Initially,
Estate Landscape complained for the entire $30,162.90 of its
second bill for the winter of 1984-85. About two weeks after
filing suit, Estate Landscape endorsed the check from Mountain
Bell and cashed it, then amended its complaint against Mountain
Bell to seek only the difference between the amount of the
check and the amount billed.
Mountain Bell moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that its letter and check tendered to Estate Landscape were an
accord and satisfaction of its obligation under the snow
removal contract. The district court, per Judge Michael R.
Murphy, denied the motion, noting that Mountain Bell admitted
that it owed the amounts tendered in the check. The case
proceeded to trial before the bench.
At trial, Judge Timothy R. Hanson considered the earlier
denial of summary judgment to have resolved the question of
accord and satisfaction, and granted judgment to Estate
Landscape for the amount of its bill, less certain charges for
work not mentioned in the contract. The judgment included
interest accruing before judgment, compounded annually.
Mountain Bell appeals.

4. Note that the check was not enclosed, but rather had
erroneously been sent earlier. Estate Landscape admitted,
however, that it recognized that the letter referred to the
check it had earlier received from Mountain Bell.
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Factual Standard of Review in Summary Judgment
Mountain Bell now argues that the trial court erred in
treating its motion for summary judgment as dispositive of its
accord and satisfaction defense and thereafter refusing to
reopen that issue at trial on the grounds that it was law of
the case. Mountain Bell argues that the combined effect of the
dispositive summary judgment and the refusal to try the issue
was an unfairly skewed view of the facts in the district
court. Mountain Bell argues that the court views the facts for
summary judgment purposes in a light unfavorable to the moving
party, and therefore, because the summary judgment was treated
as conclusive against the movant, the movant here, Mountain
Bell, never had a chance for a fair view of the facts on the
issue.
Mountain Bell, however, is not precisely correct in thus
describing a court's factual viewpoint in deciding a motion for
summary judgment. Although it may be true for most summary
judgments that the court views the facts in favor of the
nonmovant, that formulation takes into account only perhaps the
most common outcomes of a motion for summary judgment, in which
the moving party either receives the judgment it seeks, or all
judgment is denied and the issue reserved for further
consideration. However, in this case, Mountain Bell moved for
summary judgment, and its motion was denied on the merits, and
that denial effectively disposed of Mountain Bell's accord and
satisfaction defense.5 Later, that disposition was regarded

5. This course of action was not erroneous. See National
Expositions v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 824 F.2d 131, 133 (1st
Cir. 1987); British Caledonian Airways Ltd. v. First State
Bank, 819 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir.1987); Pueblo of Santa Ana v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co., 734 F.2d 1402, 1408 (10th Cir.
1984), reversed on other grounds, 472 U.S. 237 (1985);
Giovanelli v. First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 120 Ariz. 577, 587
P.2d 763, 768 (1978); 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 at 29-35 (1983); 6 J.
Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice If 56.12
(1987).

4

as the law of the case, and the accord and satisfaction issue was
not reopened.6
Recognizing that the party adversely affected by the summary
judgment has not had an opportunity for trial, the court views
the facts in the light most favorable to that party. 7 In
situations in which summary judgment is granted, the party
adversely affected would be the party who did not move for
summary judgment. If summary judgment is denied on the merits
and a claim or defense of the movant thereby eliminated, then the
facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the moving
party. Summary judgment may also be denied without reaching the
merits of any claim or defense, often because the court cannot
(Footnote 5 continued)
In the absence of a cross-motion, the trial court should, on
its own initiative, assure that the moving party has had a fair
opportunity to address the grounds for the adverse judgment. See
Bonilla v. Nazario, 843 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 1988). A careful
practitioner would therefore file a cross-motion in an
appropriate case, to avoid concerns over the adequacy of the
movant's opportunity to address all of the material issues. In
this case, the district court, and this court as well, hold that
Mountain Bell failed to carry its burden in establishing an
accord. Mountain Bell bore in essence that same burden both in
seeking summary judgment in its favor and in avoiding an adverse
summary judgment. We therefore conclude that it had ample
opportunity to establish an accord but has not succeeded in doing
so.
6. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Sittner v. Big
Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984); Salt
.Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44-45
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d
634, 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); see also State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d
1125, 1129 (Utah 1989) (extraordinary intervening circumstances
justifying reconsideration of a decided issue).
7. See Branham v. Provo School Dist., 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989);
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989);
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 299 (Utah 1987);
Lantz v. National Semiconductor Corp.. 775 P.2d 937 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
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reconcile the material elements of the parties* versions of the
facts, and thus cannot grant a summary judgment under Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(c)*8 Since any material difference in the parties'
versions of the facts will preclude summary judgment, the
shadings of light in which the facts are viewed cannot make a
substantial difference in the result, even if the shading applied
is erroneous.
In this case, Mountain Bell was the movant for summary
judgment on the accord and satisfaction issue. The district
court's memorandum decision on Mountain Bell's motion was clearly
intended to lay the defense of accord and satisfaction to rest.
Since a defense of Mountain Bell's was thereby eliminated, the
facts should be viewed in the light favorable to Mountain Bell.
The record does not explicitly note whether the district court
thus viewed the facts; however on appeal, we view the facts
supporting a summary judgment through the same lens filter as the
trial court.9 Therefore, since the issue of correctness of the
summary judgment on its merits is before us, we proceed to review
it in the light most favorable to Mountain Bell.
Lack of an Accord
In denying summary
court reasoned that the
was severable, and that
limited to only part of

judgment on the merits, the district
contract for snow removal in this case
the scope of the accord was therefore
the contract. According to this

8. Because a summary judgment motion can be denied for at least
two reasons, either because judgment is not merited or because
factual issues preclude a grant of summary judgment/ a trial
court decision denying summary judgment should be expressed in a
brief, written statement, identifying the grounds for denying
summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). In part because of
the tentatively slanted view on the facts, findings are not
ordinarily made in resolving a motion for summary judgment, even
if the motion is resolved on the merits. The main purpose of
findings is to resolve material factual issues, Acton v. J.B.
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987), and summary judgment cannot be
granted if such issues exist. See Taylor v. Estate of Taylor,
770 P.2d 163, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Moreover, since the
favorable factual viewpoint applied for summary judgment purposes
is valid only for the motion at hand, the finality attributed to
findings would perhaps tend to give too general a validity to a
view of the facts that is entirely ad. hoc.
9. Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (1990).
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reasoning, the accord and satisfaction did not fully discharge
the contract. 10
Identifying which claim or claims are the subject of an
accord and satisfaction depends on the manifested intent of the
parties. 11 However, before we can determine the contractual
intent of the parties, we must have a contract. There is no
contractual intent to be discovered where there has been no
mutual assent. In this case, the mutual assent for the
would-be accord is lacking.^
From Mountain Bell's point of view, the accord is
contained essentially in its letter of June 14, 1985, to Estate
Landscape. However, this letter is entirely unilateral; there
is no indication that Estate Landscape assented to the letter
as an accord. Its signature on the check is not an assent to
an accord not found on the face of the check as a restrictive
endorsement,^ where the party to whom the accord is offered
has expressly rejected the proposed accord, continued the
dispute, and filed litigation to resolve it adversarially in
court. It is therefore apparent that an accord was offered, a
check tendered in anticipation that an accord would be reached,
10. See Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d
186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966); Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 13
Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962); cf. Marton Remodeling v.
Jensen, 706 P.2d 6097, 608-09 (Utah 1985); Allen-Howe
Specialties v. U.S. Constr., Inc., 611 P.2d 705 (Utah 1980).
While we recognize that Mountain Bell's letter may have had the
effect of severing the contract, we do not reach that question,
because, for lack of mutual assent, there was no contract to be
severed.
11. Ouealv v. Anderson, 714 P.2d 667, 669 (Utah 1986) ("The
scope of an accord and satisfaction is determined by the
intention of the parties. . . . " ) ; see Petersen v. Petersen,
709 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1985).
12. We therefore affirm, but for a reason differing somewhat
from the trial court's grounds for its decision. See Cox v.
Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988).
13. C£. Cove View Excavating & Constr. Co. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d
474 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), in which the acceptance of the accord
was effected by negotiating a check bearing an assent to the
accord on its face.
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and a letter sent indicating what Mountain Bell intended and
would do if the check were negotiated, but there is no
indication of Estate Landscape's assent to the accord* Even in
the light most favorable to Mountain Bell, the evidence simply
falls short of demonstrating Estate Landscape's acceptance of
Mountain Bell's offer to settle the account. It would,
perhaps, be possible to offer an accord and provide in the
offer that cashing an accompanying check would be acceptance of
the offer, since the offeror can, within reason, specify the
act that shall constitute acceptance.14 However, the offeree
can also reject the offer, after which there is nothing left to
accept. We believe that the telephone conference continuing
the dispute and the filing of litigation amount to a rejection
of the offered accord. After the litigation was underway,
there remained the question of what to do with Mountain Bell's
tendered check in Estate Landscape's possession. Estate
Landscape acted within its rights in cashing check as payment
of the portion of its claim that Mountain Bell agreed was
owing; in fact, it may have had a duty so to act in order to
properly mitigate its damages. Thus, even if we resolve any
immaterial factual doubt in Mountain Bell's favor, this appears
to be a situation in which one party asserts an accord to which
the other party, for all that appears, never agreed. In such a
case, accord and satisfaction is not a defense for lack of a
binding accord.
Compounding of Interest
Mountain Bell's final argument is that, even if it is
liable for the amount of the judgment, the interest on the
judgment should not have been compounded. The general rule is
that simple, not compound, interest accrues on a judgment,
unless the parties contract otherwise,15 which they have not
in this case, or unless the statute providing for interest on
judgments expressly requires compounding, which ours does
not. 1 6
14. Crane v. Timberbrook Village, Ltd., 774 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).
15. See Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d
551, 554-55 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (construing a note as not
providing for compound interest).
16. See Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1987); 47 C.J.S. Interest and
Usury § 24 (1982).
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This rule against compound interest on judgments is
consistent with the general judicial disfavor of interest on
interest.17 It is also of long standing and forms part of
the backdrop against which the Legislature has statutorily
provided for interest on judgments. We see no compelling
reason to alter this longstanding gloss on the judgment
interest statute.18 We therefore decline the invitation to
engraft onto the statute judicial discretion to allow compound
interest19 and reverse as to the award of compound interest.
Except in regard to the interest provided in the judgment,
the trial court's decision is affirmed. We vacate the
provisions of the judgment relating to interest and remand for
amendment of the judgment to provide for simple, rather than
compound, interest.

J^^/\^L^i^^
JohriMTarr L a r s o n ,

Judge

I CONCUR:

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

17. Watkins & Faber v. Whitelev, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah
1979); Mountain States Broadcasting Co., 783 P.2d at 555.
18. See Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281,
1283 (Utah 1987).
19. See Stroud v. Stroud. 758 P.2d 905 (Utah 1988), aff'o 738
P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

880428-CA

9

JACKSON, Judge (dissenting):
The decision and order on summary judgment was entered in
this case on December 29, 1986. The order denied Mountain
Bell's motion, which asserted the affirmative defense of accord
and satisfaction. The motion judge, who did not have before
him our recent decisions in Cove View Excavating and Constr.
Co. v. Flvnn, 758 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Masonry
Equipment & Supply v. Willco Assocs., Inc.. 755 P.2d 756 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988), ruled that Hthis case is controlled by Marton
Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985)." But the
springboard for the judge's legal analysis was that each
separate day of work pursuant to the written contract
constituted a separate claim. The court expressed
'•[reluctance] to suggest that more than one claim exists in
circumstances where the dispute arises under a single written
contract," but felt compelled by Marton to do so.
The motion judge stated, "In resolving this matter, the
court cannot artificially bifurcate a single dispute in
determining" whether there had been an accord and
satisfaction. Contrary to that statement, the court did more
than bifurcate the claim. The court treated the matter as one
of multiple claims, i.e., each day's work was a claim. Thus,
he considered the work on each of the thirty-one disputed days
to support a separate claim for relief. I consider that
premise untenable.
While the lower court did not have the benefit of Cove
View and Masonry Equipment, my colleagues do. They have
nonetheless elected to completely ignore those opinions—as
well as the lower court's reliance on Marton, a decision the
majority opinion tucks away in a footnote—and engage in a
"mutual assent" analysis.
I would rely on Cove View, where, as in this case, the
parties simply disagreed over the total amount to be paid on a
contract. The $8,613 check was tendered by Mountain Bell with
the following condition attached, with the emphasis in the
original:
Based on the above identified billing
discrepancies [sic] we have enclosed a check
for.$8613.00 which is payment in full for
satisfaction of contracted services. If you
are not willing to accept that sum, $8613.00
in full satisfaction of sums due, DO NOT
negotiate the check, for upon your
negotiation of that check, we will treat the
matter as fully paid.

ln

This language clearly asserts a dispute over billing
discrepancies, states three times that $8,613 is being tendered
as full payment, and warns against negotiating the check. What
more could Mountain Bell say to set up an offer of accord and
satisfaction? Although the offer was found in Mountain Bell's
letter, not on the check itself, Estate Landscape admitted
knowing that the express conditions in the letter related to
the $8,613 check, which it had received separately but had not
yet negotiated. A creditor may not disregard the condition
attached to a check tendered in full payment of a disputed
claim. Cove View, 758 P.2d at 478 (citing Marton Remodeling,
706 P.2d at 609). Although the majority mysteriously finds "no
indication" of Estate Landscape's assent to the offer of
accord, negotiation of the $8,613 check was itself a conclusive
manifestation of assent, resulting in an accord and
satisfaction as a matter of law regardless of its subjective
intent. See id.
Estate Landscape negotiated the check,
the matter. I would reverse.
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That is the end of
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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P.O. Box 520033
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ESTATE LANDSCAPE AND SNOW
REMOVAL SPECIALISTS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
Defendant.

])
])
]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]
)
]

Civil No.:

]
])

Judge:

C85-5197

Timothy R. Hanson

]

The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly before
the Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, the Plaintiff having been represented by Lowell V, Summerhays and David D*
Loreman, and the Defendant having been represented by Floyd
Jensen, and upon the trial of this matter having been heard, the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were made:
1

OCC270

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that tnere was a contract and that the

parties were governed by the contract.
2.

The Court finds that the work was not substandard.

3.

The Court

Plaintiff's

failure

finds that

tne contract

to submit monthly

was breached

balance

by the

statements,

how-

ever, the Court finds that the breach was not material.
4.

The Court finds that the true intent of the parties was

that the Plaintiff was entitled to bill for each

four (4) inches

of snow removed; the contract was not clear and is ambiguous.
5.

The

was within

Court

finds that the Bobcat

the terms of the contract.

The

was a front

load

and

following

year

the

Defendant again agreed to its use at $55.00 per hour.
6.
zation

The Court finds that tne Plaintiff was to get authorifor the use of further equipment, and that the dump

truck

was not authorized.
7.

The Court

finds that

the $10,000.00

limit

on the con-

tract was waived by all parties based upon the conduct of all of
the parties.
8.
Defendant

The

Court

finds

regarding

has not paid Plaintiff

the

issue of damages

that

for plowing and the use of the

front loader costs.
9.
the amount

The Court finds that the total bill was $30,162.50, and
disputed

is $21,549.50.

The

Court

finds

that

the

amount paid by Mt. Bell on the total bill was $8,613.00.

2
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10.

The Court

finds that the following dates and amounts

were not paid by Mt. Bell, and that these amounts do not include
additional sums for the use of dump trucks.
DATE

11.

AMOUNT

1984
1/08/85
1/21/85
1/26/85
2/01/85
2/04/85
2/05/85
2/06/85
2/07/85
2/08/85
2/11 - 12/85
2/13/85
2/15/85
2/18/85
2/20/85
2/22/85
2/23/85
2/25/85
2/27/85
3/02/85
3/06/85
3/07/85
3/10/85
3/15/85
3/16/85
3/18/85
3/20/85
3/25/85

$ 990.00
255.00
255.00
550.00
170.00
510.00
425.00
425.00
510.00
340.00
1,320.nQ
1,017.50
170.00
255.00
907.50
170.00
170.00
170.00
170.00
255.00
425.00
170.00
170.00
170.00
255.00
255.00
255.00
255.00

TOTAL:

$ 10,990.00

The Court finds that interest accrued on the amount due

and owing from April 16, 1985, at ten percent (10%) compounded
per annum, until the date this judgment is entered.

Thereafter,

the judgment will run at twelve percent (12%) per annum, at the
maximum legal rate, plus cost, per Rule 54, Utah Code of Civil
Procedures.
3

0GC272

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Based on the Court's Finding of Facts, it is hereby

concluded that there was no accord and satisfaction

in that the

Order of Judge Michael R. Murphy delineated the area fully and is
the law of the case.

Even if it were not the law of the case,

Exhibit 6 introduced into evidence did not fulfill the requirements of an accord and satisfaction.
2.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts, this Court

concludes that there was a written contract and the theories of
quantum merit and unjust enrichment do not apply in this case.
3.

The Court also concludes that there were ambiguities in

the contract and as the contract was drafted by Defendant

Mt.

States Telephone and Telegraph, that the contract must be construed against the party who drafted it.
4.

Based upon the Findings of Fact in this case, it is

hereby concluded that Defendant is responsible

for payment on

each increment of four (A) inches, and the time charged for the
Bobcat, and that no dump trucks were allowed based on no prior
written

modifications

of the contract

to include

such

trucks, and therefore, all costs relating to those dump

dump

trucks

are found not to be part of the contract.
5.

IT

IS THEREFORE CONCLUDED, based

on the

foregoing

Findings of Fact, that Estate Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. had fulfilled their contract to Mt. States Telephone
and Telegraph Co., and that there is a sum due and owing to Estate Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. in the amount
4

000272

of 310,990.00, plus interest from April

15, 1985, at the rate of

ten percent (10%) per annum, compounded annually, until the date
this judgment

is entered.

Thereafter, interest will he calculadeluding costs of court

ted at twelve percent (125
DATED this

, 1983.
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David 0. Loreman - 4366
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 520033
Salt Lake City, Utah 34152
Telephone: (801) 261-2887

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ESTATE LANDSCAPE AND SNOW
REMOVAL.SPECIALISTS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
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Q-2>S P " ^ ^ .

JUDGMENT

)
)
)

Civil No.:

)
)

Judge:

C85-5197

Timothy R. Hanson

)

The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly
before the Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, the
Plaintiff having been represented by Lowell V. Summerhays and
David D. Loreman and the Defendant having been represented by
Floyd Jensen, and upon the trial of this matter having been
heard,

1

V > U \ J » ^ *•

w

IT IS HEREBY ORnERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 3b 'allows:
2ased on the Court's Findings of
of

Facts and Conclusions

Law, the Court enters judgment in favor of

the Plaintiff and

against the Defendant in the anount of $10,990,00, plus interest
at the legal pre-judqinent rate of ten percent (10%) sinple interest per annum, compounded annually since the due date of April
15, 1985, to the date the judgment is entered.

Thereafter, it

will run at twelve percent (12%) per anpfum at maximum legal rate,
plus costs, per Rule 54 of the Utah C/5de of Civil Drocedure.
DATED this

1988.
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Mountain States Telephone 4 Telegraph Co.
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant.

^QmmdfL (?,.-&>/J*

0(

D.

Summary Decision and Order denying Mountain Bell's Motion for
Summary Judgment

Salt Lake County Utah

DEC ^0 1936
H Dixon Htrtdfcy.pef* 3rd Drat Court

By

-SJLJ^^JJLLJI
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ESTATE LANDSCAPE AND SNOW
REMOVAL SPECIALISTS, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,

AND ORDER
CIVIL NO.

Plaintiff,

-erssHsaaa:

t&srsiil

vs.
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
Defendant.

This Summary Decision and Order is for the purpose of apprising
the parties and counsel of the grounds for the court's ruling
and accompanying Order. A more elaborate, extensive and polished
memorandum decision in this case is not necessary and would
serve no useful purpose.
The issue presented is whether, under the undisputed facts
in this case, there was an accord and satisfaction absolving
defendant from all claims of the plaintiff for alleged breaches
of the November 15, 1985 contract for snow removal ("the contract") .
The discovery, defendant's memorandum of law, and Exhibit "C"
thereto indicate that the defendant's refusal to pay the full
amount claimed was premised on its interpretation of Exhibit
"A" to the contract and specifically paragraph D thereof entitled
"Rates and Charges."

It was defendant's position expressed
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SUMMARY DECISION

in its letter of June 14, 1985 that it would not pay for snow
removal on the specified dates when weather records indicated
snow accumulations of less than four inches.

No other basis

for disputing the claims exist in the record before this court
on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

There is no dispute

that the amounts tendered were in fact owed in accordance with
the terms of the contract.
This case is- controlled by- barton Remodeling v. Jensen,
706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985).

In applying Marton Remodeling to

the case at bar it is necessary to determine whether the plaintiff's
original assertions constituted a single claim.

In resolving

this matter, the court cannot artificially bifurcate a single
dispute in determining whether the purported accord and satisfaction
extinguished all of plaintiff's claims.

Generally, the court

would be reluctant to suggest that more than one claim exists
in circumstances where the dispute arises under a single written
contract. This case, however, is controlled by contrary precedent.
The Supreme Court in Marton Remodeling set forth two examples
of circumstances where the dispute involved more than one claim.
It did so by citing with approval its decisions in Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart. Inc.. 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966),
and Dillman v. Massey Ferguson. Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2c
296 (1962).
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SUMMARY DECISION

In Dillman the parties entered into a contract for the
termination of a dealership which included a provision whereby
the defendant was to purchase unused parts.

Defendant sorted

through the parts, accepted some, returned others, and tendered
a check for only the parts accepted.

The Court held that the

cashing of the checks did not constitute an accord and satisfaction
as to those parts rejected and returned to plaintiff.

Whereas

the Court in Dillman may have placed some reliance on the language
of the purported release as being consistent with its ruling,
the Court in Marton Remodeling expressly distingusihed Dillman
as a case which "involved two claims.ff

706 P.2d at 609.

This court cannot distinguish Dillman from the instant
case.

Much like the defendant in Dillman, the defendant here

accepted some claims and rejected others.

As in Dillman, there

appears to be no dispute as to those claims paid.
3illman:

To paraphrase

"The dispute was not as to the amount found due for

;the services paid] but as to whether [defendant] breached its
:ontract by refusing to [pay for all services rendered]."
>.2d at 298.

369

As in Dillman, the services paid for by defendant

r

ere a liquidated amount for snow removal on the occasions when

here was no contract dispute concerning accumulation.

The

octrine of accord and satisfaction generally applies only to
nliquidated claims. See, Calamari & Perillo, Contracts, Sections
-10 t o -12

(2d E d .

1977).
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PAGE FOUR

SUMMARY DECISION

Whereas there are other factors not referenced in this
Summary Decision and Order supporting denial of summary judgment
(e.g.,

intent, consideration, date of acceptance of payment,

and the reasonable expectations of the parties) , the Dillman
case, in light of its interpretation and approval in Marton
Remodeling, alone requires denial of defendant's Motion.
For the reasons set forth herein, defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is denied.
Dated this

29th

day of December; 1986.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Summary Decision and Order, postage prepaid,
to the following, this Q*'?

day of December, 198 6:

James W. Carter
Attorney for Plaintiff
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Floyd A. Jensen
Attorney for Defendant
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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HALL, CJ.f DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result

MARTON REMODELING, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Mark JENSEN, Defendant
and Appellant
MARTON REMODELING, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Mark JENSEN, Defendant and
Respondent

1. Accord and Satisfaction <§=>11(2)
Builder's cashing of $5,000 check, containing condition that "[endorsement hereof constitutes full and final satisfaction,"
where valid dispute existed as to amount
owing, constituted "accord and satisfaction" that could not be altered by builder's
addition of "not full payment" below the
condition.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Accord and Satisfaction e»ll(l)
Accord and satisfaction of single claim
is not avoided merely because amount paid
and accepted is only that which debtor concedes to be due or that debtor's view of
controversy is adopted in making settlement

Sept. 17, 1985.

3. Accord and Satisfaction e»ll(2)
Where bona fide dispute arose as to
amount owing and check was tendered by
owner to builder in full payment of unliquidated claim, the builder could not disregard
the condition attached to check.

^ Builder sued to foreclose on mechan* s lien on owner's house and lot for
$6,538.12 which builder claimed was due

4. Accord and Satisfaction <3=*1
Common-law rules of accord and satisfaction are not altered by U.C.A.1953, 70A1-207.

Nos. 18400, 18401.
Supreme Court of Utah.
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B. Ray Zoll, Salt Lake City, for Marton
Peter M. Ennenga, Midvale, for Jensen.

accord and satisfaction that could not be
altered by the words added to the condition
placed thereon by Jensen We agree.

HOWE, Justice:

Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Marton Remodeling, there was
an accord and satisfaction as we have defined that term in the previous cases decided by this Court. See Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, Utah, 610 P.2d
1369 (1980); Tates, Inc. v. Little America
Refilling Co., Utah, 535 P.2d 1228 (1975);
Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc.,
18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966); Ralph
A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building &
Loan Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669
(1938): Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39
P.2d 1073 (1935).

These appeals are from a judgment entered in an action brought by the plaintiff,
Marton Remodeling, to foreclose a mechanic's lien which it had filed against a house
and lot owned by the defendant, Mark Jensen, for $6,538.12 which it claimed was due
it for remodeling. Judgment was entered
on a jury verdict for $1,538, together with
$1,000 punitive damages, and attorney fees
of $5,950.24. The trial court remitted the
award of punitive damages and reduced the
attorney fees by 50 percent to $2,976.12.
Jensen appeals from that judgment in case
No. 18400, and in case No. 18401, Marton
appeals, seeking to reinstate the award of
punitive damages and recover the full
amount of attorney fees awarded by the
jury.
Jensen engaged Marton Remodeling in a
"time and materials" contract to remodel
his house. When Marton presented the
final bill for $6,538.12, Jensen contended
that the number of hours claimed was excessive. He offered to pay $5,000 because
he considered the services were worth that
amount, but Marton refused the offer.
Nevertheless, Jensen sent Marton a $5,000
check with the following condition placed
thereon: "Endorsement hereof constitutes
full and final satisfaction of any and all
claims payee may have against Mark S.
Jensen, or his property, arising from any
circumstances existing on the date hereof."
Marton wrote a letter to Jensen refusing to
accept the check in full payment and demanded the balance. When Jensen made
no further payment, Marton filed a mechanic's lien on Jensen's property and
cashed the check after writing "not full
payment" below the condition. This action
was then brought by Marton to recover the
$1,538 balance plus punitive damages and
attorney fees.
[1] Jensen contends that the trial court
erred in refusing to direct a verdict in his
favor because, as a matter of law, Marton's
cashing of the $5,000 check constituted an

Marton asserts that there was not an
accord and satisfaction because Marton
was unquestionably entitled to the $5,000
represented by the check, and the only
dispute was whether any further amount
was owing. He cites Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., supra, in support
of that reasoning. That reliance is misplaced because that case did not involve a
single claim as in the instant case. In
Bennett, a salesman who was paid only
commissions on sales made by him was put
on a fixed monthly salary by his employer.
When he terminated his employment two
months later, he demanded payment of his
fixed monthly salary then due him plus
unpaid commissions on sales allegedly
made by him prior to the change. He also
sought reimbursement of stock payments.
His employer gave him a check for the
amount of the fixed monthly salary then
due him, which he cashed, bearing the
statement that it was "payment in full of
the account stated below—endorsement of
check by payee is sufficient receipt." This
Court viewed the salesman as having two
claims: one for his fixed monthly salary
which was not in dispute and another claim
for his commissions about which there was
a dispute. The amount of the check covered only the fixed monthly salary and did
not purport to relate to the claim for commissions. We held that the plaintiffs cash-
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ing of the check in those circumstances
could not constitute an accord and satisfaction of the claim for commissions. We
cited Dilhnan v. Massey Ferguson, Inc.,
13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962), which
also involved two claims, in support of our
decision. The Alaska Supreme Court in
Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, Alaska, 673
P.2d 774 (1983), held that a single claim,
including both its disputed and undisputed
elements, is unitary and not subject to division so long as the whole claim is unliquidated.
Marton is not aided by Allen-Howe Specialties v. U.S. Construction, Inc., Utah,
611 P.2d 705 (1980). There, the cashing of
a check representing a progress payment
on a contract was held not to be an accord
and satisfaction of all amounts owing up to
that time. At the time the progress payment was made, there was no dispute and,
unlike the instant case, it was not tendered
as the last payment of the contract where
finality and settlement is usually sought
and intended.
[2] Thus, neither of those cases is dispositive here where we are confronted with
a single unliquidated claim, viz., the balance owing on a "time and materials" contract. Instead, the general rule applies,
which is that an accord and satisfaction of
a single claim is not avoided merely because the amount paid and accepted is only
that which the debtor concedes to be due or
that his view of the controversy is adopted
in making the settlement. Air Van Lines,
Inc. v. Buster, supra; North
American
Union v. Montenie, 68 Colo. 220, 189 P. 16
(1920); Stanley-Thompson
Liquor Co. v.
Southern
Colorado Mercantile Co., 65
Colo. 587, 178 P. 577, 4 A.L.R. 471 (1919); 1
CJ.S. Accord and Satisfaction
§ 32
(1936). Corbin on Contracts § 1289 approves the rule and states that it is supported by the greater number of cases,
citing as good examples Miller v. Prince
Street Elevator Co., 41 N.M. 330, 68 P.2d
663 (1937), Treat v. Price, 47 Neb. 875, 66
N.W. 834 (1896), and Fuller v. Kemp, 138
N.Y. 231, 33 N.E. 1034 (1893).

[3] It is of no legal consequence that
Marton told Jensen upon receipt of the
$5,000 check that he did not regard it as
payment in full. Marton could not disregard with immunity the condition placed
on the check by Jensen by writing "not full
payment" under the condition. It is true
that there is not an automatic accord and
satisfaction every time a creditor cashes a
check bearing a "paid in full" notation.
Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211, 125 P.
412 (1912). An accord and satisfaction requires that there be an unliquidated claim
or a bona fide dispute over the amount due.
Ashton v. Skeen, supra. Payment must
be tendered in full settlement of the entire
dispute and not in satisfaction of a separate undisputed obligation, as in Bennett v.
Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., supra.
Payment cannot be given merely as a
progress payment, as in Allen-Howe v.
U.S. Construction, Inc., supra. However,
when a bona fide dispute arises (the existence of which Marton does not dispute in
this appeal) and a check is tendered in full
payment of an unliquidated claim as we
have here, arising out of a "time and materials" contract, the creditor may not disregard the condition attached. Corbin on
Contracts § 1279 explains:
The fact that the creditor scratches out
the words "in full payment," or other
similar words indicating that the payment is tendered in full satisfaction, does
not prevent his retention of the money
from operating as an assent to the discharge. The creditor's action in such
case is quite inconsistent with his words.
It may, indeed, be clear that he does not
in fact assent to the offer made by the
debtor, so that there is no actual "meeting of the minds." But this is merely
another illustration of the fact that the
making of a contract frequently does not
require such an actual meeting.
(Footnote omitted.) Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 281 is to the same effect
and provides the following illustration:
6. A contracts with B to have repairs
made on A's house, no price being fixed.
B sends A a bill for $1,000. A honestly
disputes this amount and sends a letter
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explaining that he thinks the amount excessive and is enclosing a check for S800
as payment in full B, after reading the
letter, indorses the check and deposits it
in his bank for collection. B is bound by
an accord under which he promises to
accept payment of the check in satisfaction of A's debt for repairs. The result
is the same if, before indorsing the
check, B adds the words "Accepted under protest as part payment" The result would be different, however, if B's
claim were liquidated, undisputed and
matured.
(Citation omitted.) See Miller v. Prince
Street Elevator Co., supra, Wilmeth v.
Lee, Okla., 316 P.2d 614 (1957), and Graf
fam v. Geronda, Me., 304 A.2d 76 (1973),
for cases where it was held that a creditor
cannot avoid the consequences of his exercise of dominion by a declaration that he
does not assent to the condition attached
by the debtor. The last cited case succinctly stated the law to be, "The law gave the
plaintiffs the choice of accepting the check
on defendant's terms or of returning it."
[4] Marton contends that under U.C.A.,
1953, § 70A-1-207, it avoided the condition
placed on the check by Jensen when it
added the words "not full payment." Marton asserts that those were words of reservation of rights recognized by section 70A1-207. Without deciding whether the
wording added by Marton could be so interpreted, no authority is cited by Marton that
section 70A-1-207 applies to a "full payment" check. Of the authorities which we
have found, the better reasoned hold that
our section 70A-1-207 (which is identical to
section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial
Code) does not alter the common law rules
of accord and satisfaction. See Flambeau
Products Corp. v. Honeywell Information
Systems, Inc., 116 Wis.2d 95, 341 N.W.2d
655 (1984); R.A. Reitker
Construction,
Inc. v. Wheatland Rural Electric Association, Colo.App., 680 P.2d 1342 (1984);
Stultz Electric Works v. Marine Hydraulic Engineering Co., Me., 484 A.2d 1008
(1984); Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, supra; Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon,
Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, Inc., 63 Or.App. 364,

664 P.2d 419 (1983); Connecticut
Printers.
Inc. v. Gus K roesen, Inc., 134 Cal.App.3d
54, 184 Cal.Rptr. 436 (1982); Milgram
Food Stores, Inc. v. Gelco Corp., 550
F.Supp. 992 (W.D.Mo.1982); Pillow v.
Thermogas Co. of Walnut Ridge, 6 Ark.
App. 402, 644 S.W.2d 292 (1982); Eder v.
Yvette B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., Fla.App.,
407 So.2d 312 (1981); Chancellor, Inc. v.
Hamilton Appliance Co., 175 NJ.Super.
345, 418 A.2d 1326 (1980); Brown v. Coastal Trucking, Inc., 44 N.C.App. 454, 261
S.E.2d 266 (1980); State Department of
Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash.App.
671, 610 P.2d 390 (1980); and John v.
Burns, Wyo., 593 P.2d 828 (1979) (noted
with approval in Recent Developments in
Utah Law, 1980 Utah L.Rev. 649, 710);
Rosenthal, Discord and
Dissatisfaction:
Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 Colum.L.Rev. 48 (1978)).
Several courts have stated that if they
were to construe the statute to limit accord
and satisfaction, it would jeopardize a convenient and valuable means of achieving
informal settlements. Les Schwab Tire
Centers of Oregon, Inc. v. Ivory Ranch,
Inc., supra. The law favors compromise in
order to limit litigation. Accord and satisfaction serves this goal. Air Van Lines,
Inc. v. Buster, supra. As stated by Judge
Corbin in Pillow v. Thermogas Co. of Walnut Ridge, supra, "If we were to decide
that a creditor can reserve his rights on a
'payment in full' check, it would seriously
circumvent what has been universally accepted in the business community as a convenient means for the resolution of disagreements."
Our determination that there was an accord and satisfaction obviates the necessity
of our consideration of any of the other
points raised in either appeal. The judgment in favor of the plaintiff is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the trial court
to enter judgment in favor of the defendant. Costs on appeal are awarded to defendant.
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur.

STATE v. STAYER
Cite as 706 P.2d 611 ( U t a h

STEWART, J., dissents.
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate
herein.
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COVE VIEW EXCAVATING AND
CONSTRUCTION CO., Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
D. Thomas FLYNN and D. Thomas
Flynn Construction, Inc.,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 870180-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
July 28, 1988.

Creditor brought action against debtor
to recover an unpaid balance of amount
due on labor and materials supplied by
creditor. The Tenth Circuit Court, Sevier
County, Don V. Tibbs, J., entered judgment
against debtor, and debtor appealed. -The
Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that (1)
creditor's negotiation of debtor's check,
which contained handwritten restriction
that payment was in full for all labor and
materials owed creditor, resulted in accord
and satisfaction as matter of law, although
debtor crossed out restrictive language on
check before negotiating it, and (2) finding
that debtor's tender of check containing
handwritten restriction was payment on ongoing account or progress payment was
improper.
Reversed and remanded with; di-:
rections.
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1. Accord and Satisfaction <s=»4, 26(1)
Elements essential to contracts generally must be present in accord and satisfaction, including offer and acceptance, and
meeting of minds; burden of proving every
necessary element is on party claiming accord and satisfaction.
2. Accord and Satisfaction <3=>11(2)
There is no automatic accord and satisfaction every time creditor cashes debtor's
check bearing paid-in-full notation or some
equivalent language; there must also be
unliquidated claim or bona fide dispute
over liquidated amount due creditor.

tempted to present check to satisfy in full
claims of creditor, creditor knew or reasonably should have known from language on
check that debtor disputed creditor's computation of amount due and was making
offer of accord and satisfaction, and fact
that creditor did not subjectively intend to
accept check as full payment of debtor's
obligation was legally irrelevant

3. Appeal and Error <s=>1008.1(5)
Finding of fact is clearly erroneous if
it is without adequate evidentiary foundation or if it is induced by erroneous view of
law. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a).

8. Accord and Satisfaction <3=>26(3)
Finding that debtor's tender of check,
which contained handwritten restriction
that payment was in full for all labor and
materials owed creditor, was payment on
ongoing account or progress payment and
not offer of accord and satisfaction was
improper; contract between debtor and
creditor was not for fixed sum, and creditor
did not reject tender of final and full payment under contract

4. Appeal and Error <3=>1008.1(5), 1012.1(4)
Reviewing court will not set aside trial
court's findings unless they are against
clear weight of evidence or reviewing court
otherwise reaches definite and firm conviction that mistake has been made.

John Burton Anderson, Kevin Olsen (argued), Salt Lake City, for defendants and
appellants.
Marcus Taylor, Richfield, for plaintiff
and respondent

5. Appeal and Error <3»842(2)
Conclusions of law are reviewed on
appeal for correctness without any deference to trial court

Before BENCH, JACKSON and
BILLINGS, JJ.

6. Accord and Satisfaction <s»ll(2)
Restrictive language on debtor's check
to creditor is one evidentiary fact to be
considered with other evidence, if any, in
making factual determination of whether
creditor knew or should have known that
debtor's payment was tendered as full satisfaction of identified obligation,

JACKSON, Judge:
D. Thomas Flynn Construction, Inc. and
D. Thomas Flynn ("Flynn") appeal from
the $1,517.50 circuit court judgment entered against them pursuant to an oral
agreement for the purchase of construction
materials and the rental of a pump and a
backhoe. We reverse the judgment and
remand the case to the trial court for entry
of judgment in appellants' favor.
In the spring of 1984, Flynn talked to
Charles Wayne Grundy ("Grundy")* president of respondent Cove View Excavating
and Construction Company ("Cove View"),
about a few days' use of Grundy's large
backhoe.-•;Flynn needed the.equipment to
complete excavation work he was performing on a highway project The agreed rental charge was $125 per hour, but no specif-

7. Accord and Satisfaction <s=»ll(3)
Creditor's negotiation of debtor's
check, which contained handwritten restriction that payment was in full for all labor
and materials owed creditor, resulted in
accord and satisfaction as matter of law,
although creditor crossed out restrictive
language on check before negotiating it;
restrictive language on check was clear and
definite offer to settle entire account with
creditor, creditor admitted that debtor at-
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ic number of hours was set With Grundy
as its operator, the backhoe was put to
work on the job site from May 7 through
May 15. A large pump Flynn eventually
needed because of unexpected water problems on the job was also rented from Grundy at an orally agreed-upon $35 daily
charge, with no specific number of days
set.
On May 25, Grundy sent an invoice to
Flynn for $5,922.50, including 41.5 hours
for backhoe rental on May 7, 8, 9, 10 and
15, seventeen days of pump rental from
May 8 through May 25, and $140 for purchased construction materials. Flynn disagreed with the number of hours billed for
the backhoe and the number of days billed
for the pump, which was removed from the
job site on June 14. According to his time
records, he only owed Grundy a total of
$4,060 for materials, pump rental, and
backhoe rental through June 26. On that
day, he sent to Cove View a check for
$5,000 with the following handwritten notation on the front of the check: "pmt in full
to date labor & materials." In addition,
the back of the check contained a handwritten restriction: "payment in full for all
labor and materials to 6/26/84."
On June 27, before receiving the check,
Grundy sent a second invoice to Flynn that
included the overdue May invoice amount
plus twenty more days of pump rental
(from May 26 through June 14) and pump
repair costs, for a total of $6,724.56. No
additional hours were billed for backhoe
rental On the advice of counsel, Grundy
crossed out the restrictive language on the
back of the check and negotiated it He
thereafter billed Flynn for the unpaid
$1,724.56 balance and eventually filed this
suit
At the bench trial, Flynn produced his
daily records showing fewer hours of usage than claimed by Grundy in his billings.
Flynn asserted they had agreed he would
be charged only for the time the backhoe
was actually in use, as opposed to on the
job. He also claimed the rental of the
pump was only for the days of actual use,
Le., through May 25, not all the days he
had it in his possession. Grundy contra-

dicted this and testified his billings were
compiled from his memory and from the
daily journals in which he recorded how
many hours the backhoe was on the job.
According to him, they had agreed Flynn
was to be billed for the number of days he
had the pump. The trial court resolved
these disputed factual matters in favor of
Cove View, disallowing only the pump repair costs and three days of pump rental
charges when the pump was broken.
[1] In support of their motion for summary judgment at the close of respondent's
evidence, later denied, appellants had argued they were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law because, under Marion Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah
1985), the parties had reached an accord
and satisfaction of Cove View's claim. An
accord and satisfaction arises when the
parties to a contract agree that a different
performance, offered in substitution of the
originally agreed-upon performance, will
discharge the obligation created under the
original agreement Golden Key Realty,
Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah
1985); Brimley v. Gasser, 754 P.2d 97, 98
(Utah App.1988). The elements essential
to contracts generally must be present in
an accord and satisfaction, including an
offer and acceptance and a meeting of the
minds. Sporv. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1987)/
The burden of proving every necessary element is on the party claiming an accord and
satisfaction. Bench v. Bechtel Civil &
Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460,461 (Utah App.
1988).
[2] As the court pointed out in Marion
Remodeling, there is not an automatic accord and satisfaction every time a creditor
cashes a debtor's check bearing a "paid in
full" notation or some equivalent language,*
Marion Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 609 (citing Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211, 125
P. 412 (1912)). There must also be an
unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute
over the liquidated amount due the credk
tor: Id. In such cases, there is sufficient
consideration to support the accord and
satisfaction because the person's tender of
the check on condition that it be accepted
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as full payment constitutes a surrender of
the right to dispute the initial obligation.
See Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610
P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980).1 Because
there must be an unliquidated or disputed
claim, it follows that the obligor's tendered
payment cannot be given merely as a
"progress payment" on an indivisible contract for a liquidated amount, as in AllenHowe Specialties v. U.S. Constr., Inc., 611
P.2d 705 (Utah 1980). See Marton Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 609.
In his oral ruling from the bench after
appellants had put on their case, the trial
judge gave two reasons for rejecting
Flynn's defense that an accord and satisfaction of the disputed rental charges had
taken place when Grundy cashed the June
26 check. First, the court expressed its
view that it was not "fair" or "proper" for
Flynn to raise a dispute regarding the
hours billed by merely sending the check
with restrictive language the court concluded had "no effect" Second, the trial court
characterized the June 26 check as payment on an "ongoing account" because
Flynn still had the pump after the first
billing was sent.
Respondent's
counsel
subsequently
drafted the sparse written findings and
conclusions in which neither of these two
reasons is mentioned. Instead, the conclusion was that no accord and satisfaction
had been reached solely because, despite
the restrictive language on the check,
Grundy had intended to accept the check as
partial payment of the first invoice, not as
full payment of Flynn's entire bill.

that a mistake has been made. Western
Kane County Special Serv. Distr. No. 1 v.
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P„2d 1376, 1377
(Utah 1987). Conclusions of law, however,
are simply reviewed on appeal for correctness without any deference to the trial
court. Id. at 1378.
On appeal, appellants assert (1) the evidence does not support the findings that
the claim at issue here was undisputed and
that Flynn's payment was on an ongoing
account; and (2) the trial court erroneously
interpreted and applied the law of accord
and satisfaction. They contend the limitation on the check was itself a clear indication of dispute and an offer of full payment
of Flynn's account through June 26—for
less than the amount Grundy claimed was
due through that date—which Grundy accepted by cashing the check, notwithstanding his actual intent We agree.
The trial court apparently determined
this was not a disputed claim because there
were no discussions or correspondence to
that effect between the parties prior to or
contemporaneous with the check itself.
However, there is no legal support for the
proposition that restrictive language on the
tendered check is alone insufficient to create the dispute required for an accord and
satisfaction. In Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah
2d 275, 437 P.2d 202, 207 (1968), the Utah
Supreme Court suggested that restrictive
wording accompanying a tender of full payment could be a sufficient expression of the
debtor's intention that it only be accepted
as full payment of the pending claim.

[3-5] Under the standard of review set
forth in Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a), a finding of
fact is clearly erroneous if it is without
adequate evidentiary foundation or if it is
induced by an erroneous view of the law.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1987). We will not set aside the trial
court's findings unless they are against the
clear weight of the evidence or we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction

[6] The restrictive language is merely
one evidentiary fact to be considered with
other evidence, if any, in making the factual determination of whether the creditor
knew or should have known that the payment was tendered as full satisfaction of
an identified obligation of the debtor. 6 A.
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1277
(1962). See Rivervalley Co. v. Deposit
Guaranty Nat'l Bank, 331 RSupp. 698,
708-09 (N.D.Miss.1971) (applying Mississip-

1. Where, however, the underlying claim is liquidated and certain as to amount, separate
consideration must be found to support the
accord; otherwise, the obligor binds himsdf

to do nothing he was not already obligated to
. do, and the obligee's promise to accept a sub* stitute performance is unenforceable. * _
Sugarhouse fuu Co., 610 ?2d at 1372.
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pi law). See generally Annotation, Accord
and Satisfaction—Check Acceptance, 42
A.L.R.4th 12 (1985).
[7] Despite the fact that Flynn had not
yet received Cove View's second invoice
when he sent the check, the language on
the front and back is a clear and definite
offer to settle his entire account through
June 26 for less than Cove View was claiming as due through that date. This openended, oral equipment rental agreement for
unspecified total time periods was—by its
very nature—likely to lead to differing tallies of the hours and days to be billed.
Flynn did not have possession of Cove
View's equipment after June 15. The June
26 check was for almost $1,000 less than
what Cove View claimed on its first invoice.
Grundy did not contend he misunderstood
Flynn's intent in sending the check or the
meaning of the limiting words. Indeed,
during pretrial discovery he admitted that
"Defendants attempted to present said
check to satisfy in full the claims of Plaintiff
" Grundy did not just take the
check and deposit it without concern for
the notations on it. He waited and sought
the advice of his attorney, who told him to
cross out the restrictive endorsement and
negotiate the check. Grundy knew or reasonably should have known—from the nature of the rental agreement itself and
from the language on the check—that
Flynn disputed Cove View's computation of
the total number of hours of equipment
rental and was making an offer of accord
and satisfaction. The trial court's finding
to the contrary is clearly erroneous.
In light of the express condition on the
check, the fact that Grundy did not subjectively intend to accept the check as full
payment of Flynn's obligation is legally
irrelevant A creditor may not disregard
the condition attached to a check tendered
in full payment of an unliquidated or disputed claim. Marton Remodeling, 706
P.2d at 609.* Grundy's options were to
2. See Pino v. Lopez, 361 So.2d 192 (Fia^pp.
1978) (accord and satisfaction found where
creditor accepted check with notation "Full and
final payment for all goods, services and claims
to date"), cert dismissed, 365 So.2d 714 (Fla.
1978); Young v. Proctor, 119 GaApp. 165, 166

accept the check on Flynn's terms or return
it. See id. at 610. See also Air Van
Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774, 778
(Alaska 1983); Graff am v. Geronda, 304
A.2d 76, 80 (Me.1973). His negotiation of
Flynn's check was an acceptance of Flynn's
offer of full payment, notwithstanding his
lack of any actual intent to accept it as
such.
The fact that the creditor scratches out
the words "in full payment," or other
similar words indicating that the payment is tendered in full satisfaction, does
not prevent his retention of the money
from operating as an assent to the discharge
It may, indeed, be clear that^
he does not in fact assent to the offer
made by the debtor, so that there is no
actual "meeting of the minds." But this*
is merely another illustration of the fact
that the making of a contract frequently
does not require such an actual meeting.6 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1279
(1962) (quoted with approval in Marton Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 609). See Spot, 740.
P.2d at 1308 (acceptance of an offer to
rescind a contract may be inferred from a
party's conduct). The trial court thus incorrectly concluded that respondent could
cross out and thereby vitiate the restrictions on Flynn's check.
In explaining from the bench his ruling
that there was no accord and satisfaction,
the trial judge stated this was an "ongoing
account," the significance of which is not
set forth. For reasons that are not apparent in the record, this finding does not
reappear in the writtenfindingsof fact and.
conclusions of law. It could be construed
as another way of saying, as the written
findings and conclusions suggest, that
Grundy accepted the check only with the
actual intent to apply it as partial payment
of Flynn's bilL However, Grundy's negotiation of this check resulted in an accord
and satisfaction as a matter of law regardless of his subjective intent
SJE^d 423 (1969) (restrictive endorsement for
"all bookkeeping & accounting services to
date*); Graffam v. Geronda, 304 A2d 76 (Me.
1973) ("Full and final payment for product received December 18, 1969").

COVE VIEW EXCAVAT JG & CONST, v. FLYNN
Cite a« 758 P.2d 4

[8] On the other hand, a careful reading
of the trial transcript (particularly the legal
arguments of respondent's counsel) strongly suggests that, by finding an ongoing
account, the court was equating Flynn's
check with the "progress payment" in Allen-Howe Specialties, 611 P.2d at 710. As
such, it is clearly erroneous.
In Allen-Howe Specialties, the parties
entered into an indivisible written construction contract for a liquidated amount, Le.,
$53,372. In accordance with its terms, the
defendant made regular partial payments
to the plaintiff as work progressed. Restrictive language on the back of each
check stated its endorsement acknowledged
payment in full for all labor, equipment and
materials furnished to date by the payee.
Plaintiff refused the tender of the last payment under the contract and filed suit to
recover sums, in addition to those in the
written contract, for extra work performed
The court rejected defendant's argument
that negotiation of the progress payment
checks constituted an accord and satisfaction of all claims for extra work incurred
during the time periods for which the accepted progress payments were made. Id.
at 710-11.
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In marked contrast, the contract between
Flynn and Cove View was not for a fixed
sum. It was for an undetermined number
of hours and days of rental that were undisputedly over when Flynn sent his check;
the parties simply disagreed over the total
amount to be paid. Unlike the plaintiff in
Allen-Howe Specialties, Grundy did not
reject the tender of final and full payment
under the contract Instead, he accepted a
check with an express condition that it was
offered as "payment in full for all labor
and materials to 6/26/84/' resulting in an
accord and satisfaction of all Cove View's
claims through that date.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for entry
of judgment in appellants' favor. Costs to
appellants.
BILLINGS and BENCH, JJ., concur.

